







When human capital skills diﬀer in their ability to attract oﬀers from
alternative employers, a potential ineﬃciency in human capital investment
arises. If a worker’s ability and investments are observed by the labour
market only when the worker invests in self-promoting activities, then high-
ability workers overinvest in self-promotion. No bond is posted in the con-
tract that both attains eﬃcient investment and minimizes the bond subject
to individual rationality constraints and the zero proﬁt condition. The con-
tract is one in which the ﬁrm (i) oﬀers to match outside oﬀers strategically
and (ii) guarantees a minimum wage. The model predicts that, under both
the spot market contract and the eﬃcient contract, wage declines with se-
niority even when conditioning on high ability. This prediction is consistent
with the stylized fact regarding the decline of wages with seniority in acad-
emia. The model can also explain how the seniority wage premium may
vary across disciplines, time, and schools.
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While on the job, workers invest in general human capital skills to make themselves
more valuable to their employers, and also more attractive to other ﬁrms. Skills
diﬀer in their potential for attracting the attention of employers, both internal1
and external. I call a skill “visible” if it has a strong potential for attracting the
attention of external employers. Such employers who recognize a worker’s high
level of some visible skill may try to attract the worker by oﬀering a higher wage.
This activity gives workers in a spot market an incentive to over-invest in the self-
promoting visible skill. I investigate contracts that induce eﬃcient investment
in both visible and invisible skills. My general objective is to understand the
employment relationship that develops under such circumstances.
Eﬃcient investment may be induced by a contract in which a worker posts a
“bond” that is forfeited if the worker is revealed not to have invested eﬃciently.
No bond is needed in the eﬃcient contract that I consider. The infrequent arrival
of outside oﬀers can be exploited by a ﬁrm in its design of this contract. Under
the eﬃcient contract, a ﬁrm assesses a worker who reveals an outside oﬀer. The
contract provides incentives for eﬃcient investment by: (1) a promise to match
an outside oﬀer received by any worker who produces an eﬃcient output; (2) a
commitment not to match outside oﬀers of a worker who produced an ineﬃcient
output; (3) a guarantee of a minimum base wage. An implication of (2) is that
those who invest ineﬃciently generate only low outside oﬀers.
A motivation for my model is the observation that in academia, professors often
use outside oﬀers to obtain a raise in salary from their employer. A rationalization
of this practice is that it is costly for universities to observe the market value of a
faculty member in the absence of an outside oﬀer, so that, to minimize inspection
costs, they inspect the value of an employee and increase the employee’s salary
signiﬁcantly only when the employee reveals a credible outside oﬀer.
1The more general the human capital skills, the higher the cost a ﬁrm incurs to discover the
skills in which a worker has invested.
2I ﬁnd that, under either the spot market contract or the eﬃcient contract, the
average wage of those who leave a ﬁrm is strictly higher than that of those who
remain. This diﬀerence persists even when I condition on productivity. This ﬁts
the empirical ﬁndings of Ransom (1993) and Bratsberg et al. (2003) regarding
the U.S. academic labour market. They ﬁnd that the salaries of academics, unlike
salaries in the non-academic labour force, decrease with seniority even when con-
trolling for productivity. (Ransom uses cross section data and controls for quantity
of publications, Bratsberg et al. use panel data and control for both quantity and
quality of publications.) In a model in which visible skills are present, Lazear
(1986a) and Harris and Holmstrom (1982) ﬁnd analytically that the average wage
of those who leave is higher than that of those who remain but that the diﬀerences
disappear when conditioning on productivity. Thus, these models do not explain
the empirical negative seniority wage premium in academia. Ransom (1993) sug-
gests that high employee moving costs explain the diﬀerence between the market
wage of an academic and the wage that an incumbent university needs to pay. His
analytical ﬁndings remain when he conditions on productivity. His model predicts
that the negative seniority wage premium (even when controlling for productivity)
should exist in any industry (including that of academics and professional athletes
who are free agents) for which the worker’s human capital is mainly general (or at
least industry-speciﬁc) and moving costs are positive (e.g., when jobs are isolated
geographically). By contrast, my model makes no prediction for professional ath-
letes (who are evaluated constantly and publicly) but does make predictions for
academics (who are evaluated upon promotion and upon receiving outside oﬀers).
I ﬁnd that the negative seniority wage premium holds whenever
• Human capital is general (or, at least, industry- and not ﬁrm-speciﬁc).
• There are no trade secrets.
• Outside oﬀers are scarce.
• The employee engages in multiple tasks, some of which are visible.
3• Employee output is costly to assess.
The ﬁrst two assumptions are implicit. Trade secrets and ﬁrm-speciﬁc human
capital skills are absent in my model. (If they were present, outside oﬀers would
be counterproductive for a ﬁrm). In academia, professors have little ﬁrm-speciﬁc
human capital and few trade secrets so that the use of outside oﬀers to generate
internal pay raises is eﬃcient.
This paper complements research aiming to understand the contracts and in-
centives that emerge when employees may invest in human capital that is valuable
both to their current employer and to alternative employers. Carmichael (1983,
1988), Malcomson (1984), Waldman (1984, 1990), Milgrom and Oster (1987),
Kahn and Huberman (1988), MacLeod and Malcomson (1988), Ricart i Costa
(1988), Gibbons and Katz (1991), Bernhardt and Scoones (1993), Bernhardt
(1995), Chang and Wang (1996) and Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) explore how
employers manipulate rules of promotion and hiring when their knowledge about
their employees is superior to that of alternative employers. Instead, this paper
studies the case in which career concerns motivate workers to promote themselves
directly to the market so that the knowledge of alternative employers about an
incumbent employer’s workers may be equal or superior to that of the incumbent
ﬁrm. (The asymmetric information assumption that I employ is realistic when,
for example, a ﬁrm has many branches2 or when workers are highly specialized3.
A variant of the model with symmetric information is considered in Section 3.)
In the career concerns literature4, a worker chooses how much costly investment
to make in output that is used by the market to assess and reward talent in a
future career. In this paper, a worker chooses how much time to allocate to a task
that aﬀects both output and the probability that the market assesses and rewards
output in the future with no change in career choice. These implicit incentives
2If a ﬁrm is geographically separated from head oﬃce, local competitors may have a better
idea of the branch manager’s eﬀorts and skills than does head oﬃce.
3If workers are highly specialized, a manager may not be able to evaluate the contribution
of each specialist as well as other specialists in competing ﬁrms.
4See for example, Dwatripont, Jewitt and Tirole (1999).
4motivate the worker to over-allocate time to the visible task in the spot market.
The presence of these implicit incentives may give rise to explicit contracts oﬀered
by the ﬁrm that mitigate against this ineﬃcient allocation of time.
My model is related also to models of multi-tasking and inﬂuence activi-
ties (Milgrom and Roberts (1982) and Milgrom (1988), Holmstrom and Milgrom
(1991)). The basic multi-tasking model in these papers ignores the eﬀect on out-
side options of time allocation across tasks. I apply it in an environment in which
time allocation across visible and invisible skills aﬀects the generation of outside
oﬀers: the more time that a worker invests in the visible skill, the higher the
probability that an outside oﬀer is generated.
Since the returns to time allocated to the visible task are not realized unless
an outside oﬀer is received, the model shares features common to the hold-up
literature5. In both the spot market contract and the eﬃcient contract, the ﬁrm
commits to a base wage that may be enhanced when an outside oﬀer is received.
2. The Model
Firms live indeﬁnitely. Short-lived risk-neutral workers work for two periods in
a perfectly competitive industry (in which proﬁts are zero) and maximize their
expected present value of income and beneﬁts. The proportion πh of the workers
have high ability h, and the proportion πl =1−πh have low ability l,w h e r el<h .
Ability aﬀects production. In the academic labour market, ability indicates the
quality of an academic’s publications. The longer a θ-ability academic spends on
research, the higher the production of θ-quality publications where θ ∈{ h,l}.
Initially, the worker and ﬁrm (denoted the inside ﬁrm) sign a contract detailing
the terms of the worker’s employment. The details depend on whether short- or
long-term contracts are feasible. After an agreement is made, the employee’s
ability is observed by the employee on the job at the beginning of the ﬁrst period.
Once ability is observed, the worker allocates one unit of time across visible and
5See, for example, Edlin and Riechelstein (1996).
5invisible activities. The visible activity aﬀects productivity in the second period
and visibility in the labour market. Output in the ﬁrst period, denoted Y0,i s
independent of a worker’s type and allocation decision. The values of t and θ in
the ﬁrst period are not observed by employers.
The second period output of a worker of type θ ∈{ h,l}, who, in the ﬁrst
period, allocates time t ∈ [0,1] on V is y(t,θ)=Y (V (t,θ),I(1 − t,θ)) where
V (t,θ) and I(1−t,θ) are the visible and invisible activity levels. At the beginning
of the second period, the ﬁrst period allocation t of a worker of type θ results,
with probability p(t,θ), in the revelation of the worker’s second period output
y(t,θ) to an outside ﬁrm, in which case this ﬁrm makes an oﬀer of a second period
wage. An academic’s publication record attracts the scrutiny of the academic’s
publications and teaching through the process of a job oﬀer. The quality of the
outside institution can be interpreted as an indication of the output of the worker.
I assume that there is an idiosyncratic component to the match between a ﬁrm
and a worker (which generates mobility). The value of a worker to each ﬁrm is
the output y(t,θ). A worker values not only wages but also beneﬁts (e.g. pension
schemes, positive externalities generated by colleagues, lifestyle opportunities af-
forded by a particular location). I assume that the ﬁrm can vary the wage but
not the beneﬁt. Beneﬁts diﬀer across ﬁrms so that a worker’s valuation of a given
wage oﬀer depends on the ﬁrm that makes the oﬀer. As it is the diﬀerence in
beneﬁts that matters, I assume that the value to the worker of the beneﬁts of
the inside ﬁrm is zero while that of the beneﬁts of an outside ﬁrm is x,w h i c hi s
distributed according to H on [−b,b] with a mean of zero. Once an oﬀer has been
received but before the worker knows the value of x, the worker decides whether
or not to reveal this information credibly to the inside ﬁrm. The worker observes
x when negotiations take place over oﬀers and counteroﬀers.
I assume that output y(t,θ) is increasing in θ (y(t,h) >y (t,l) for all t), concave
in t, and single peaked in t for t ∈ (0,1). In addition, I assume that a high-ability
worker has a comparative advantage in the visible activity: (i) a worker’s eﬃcient
6Figure 2.1: Timeline of Events
allocation6 in the visible activity rises with ability and (ii) the eﬃcient output of a
high-ability worker is unattainable by a low-ability worker. Thus, ability confers
real diﬀerences in productive capabilities among workers. Even when allocating
all available time to research, a low-ability academic is unable to produce the
high-quality research output of a high-ability academic.
Visible acitivities V are valued by the ﬁrm and also enhance a worker’s chance
of being seen to be valuable. I assume that, for any allocation of time, a more able
worker is at least as likely to be revealed to an outside ﬁrm as a less able worker;
that is, p is increasing in θ for all t ∈ (0,1) and that p(0,θ)=0for θ ∈{ h,l}).
(This makes sense in the academic labour market as high-quality publications
attract more notice than low-quality publications.) I assume that p is increasing
and concave in t. The model is illustrated in Figure 2.1.
6The eﬃcient allocation conditional on an eﬃcient match maximizes output y(t,θ).T h e
unconditional eﬃcient allocation maximizes the expected surplus y(t,θ)+p(t,θ)E max{0,x}.
7My aim is to analyze short-term spot market contracts and long-term eﬃcient
contracts. By assumption, a ﬁrm that reneges on a long-term contract is believed
to operate under a spot market (short-term) contract in the future. I consider the
eﬃcient investment, the spot market outcome, and then the eﬃcient contract.
2.1. The Eﬃcient Allocation of Time
Since wages transfer wealth from ﬁrms to workers, if the current match between
worker and ﬁrm cannot be improved upon, the eﬃcient allocation of time maxi-
mizes output y(t,θ). Let subscript t denote the variable of partial diﬀerentiation.
The conditional eﬃcient investment κ(θ) of a worker of ability θ satisﬁes
yt(κ(θ),θ)=0 . (2.1)
The unconditional eﬃcient investment of time takes into account that investment
aﬀects the probability of obtaining a better match. That is, the unconditional
eﬃcient investment T(θ) of a worker of type θ maximizes the expected surplus
(1 − p(t,θ))y(t,θ)+p(t,θ)(y(t,θ)+e x pm a x {0,x})
If expmax{0,x} satisﬁes yt(1,θ)+pt(1,θ)expmax{0,x} < 0,t h e nT(θ) satisﬁes
yt(T(θ),θ)+pt(T(θ),θ)expmax{0,x} =0 (2.2)
I brieﬂy discuss the case that T(θ)=1in Section 3.
By assumption, a high-ability worker has a comparative advantage in the vis-
ible activity so that the eﬃcient investments (both κ(θ) and T(θ))i n c r e a s ei n
ability.7 That the eﬃcient (both conditional and unconditional) output increases
in ability follows from the assumption that both y(t,θ) and p(t,θ) increase in θ.
The result below compares the two eﬃcient investments.
7If the derivatives yt and pt increase in θ for t ∈ [0,1], then this implies a single crossing
property that is suﬃcient to imply both that the eﬃicent investment increases in ability and
that a low ability worker is unable to produce the constrained eﬃcient output of a high ability
worker. See Proposition A.1 in the Appendix.
8Proposition 2.1. T(θ) >κ (θ) for θ ∈{ l,h}.I fyt or pt shifts up, then T(θ) and
κ(θ) both increase.
Proof. This follows from concavity of y and p and monotonicity of p in t.
This makes sense. Whenever the eﬀectiveness of time spent on the visible
activity increases, the eﬃcient level of the visible activity increases. Note also
that the presence of expmax{0,x} distorts the unconditional eﬃcient investment
away from the conditional eﬃcient investment. I assume that this distortion is
small enough that, a low-ability worker is unable to produce the unconditional
eﬃcient output of a high-ability worker.
2.2. The Spot Market Outcome
I assume that long-term contracts are infeasible in the spot market for workers.
Firms earn zero proﬁts and may enter and exit costlessly.
Since workers in the ﬁrst period are identical, each worker earns ﬁrst-period
output Y0 in the ﬁrst period in a spot market. Assume that the initial contract
speciﬁes that a worker earns a base wage of w in the second period if no outside
oﬀers have been revealed. (Later I discuss the equilibrium spot wage.)
If a worker (of type θ who invests t) receives an outside oﬀer and reveals it to
the inside ﬁrm, a bidding process begins. This bidding process is modelled as an
ascending bid oral auction with two bidders whose common valuation equals the
worker’s output y(t,θ). In equilibrium, each ﬁrm bids up to the worker’s output
so that the worker’s expected salary plus beneﬁts is y(t,θ)+e x pm a x {0,x}.I f
the worker does not reveal an outside oﬀer then the worker earns w in salary
and expected beneﬁts. A worker reveals outside oﬀers only when y(t,θ) ≥ w −
expmax{0,x} and so outside ﬁrms make oﬀers only to workers whose output
is at least as high as w − expmax{0,x}.T h u s , i f y(t,θ) ≥ w − expmax{0,x}
then, with probability p(t,θ), there is an outside bidder and the worker obtains
y(t,θ)+expmax{0,x}. The possible consequences of a worker’s decision to choose
t such that y(t,θ) ≥ w − E max{0,x} a r ed e p i c t e di nF i g u r e2 . 2 .
9Figure 2.2: Consequences of a Worker’s Decision if y(t,θ) ≥ w − expmax{0,x}
2.2.1. Spot Market Investment in Visible Skills
Given the current base wage w and expected non-wage beneﬁts expmax{0,x},a
worker of type θ maximizes expected income by choosing an investment t ∈ [0,1]





w + p(t,θ)[y(t,θ) − (w − expmax{0,x})] if y(t,θ) ≥ w − expmax{0,x}
w if y(t,θ) <w− expmax{0,x}
.
Denote the maximizer by τθ(w−expmax{0,x}).I fw−expmax{0,x} >y (κ(θ),θ)
then the worker’s highest expected income is w. The worker reveals no oﬀers in
this case and so is indiﬀerent among all allocations. So as not to artiﬁcially
bias the results away from the eﬃcient allocation and to maintain continuity, I
assume that the worker invests the conditional eﬃcient amount κ(θ) in this case.
The next result states that the worker over-invests in V i nt h es p o tm a r k e tw h e n
y(κ(θ),θ) >w−expmax{0,x}. Proofs omitted from the text are in the Appendix.
10Figure 2.3: Graph of G if y(κ(h),h) >z= w − expmax{0,x}
Proposition 2.2. Ify(κ(θ),θ) >w −expmax{0,x} then (1) ﬁrst order-conditions
are suﬃcient to characterize τθ(w − expmax{0,x}) = argmaxt G and (2) τθ(w −
expmax{0,x}) exceeds the conditional eﬃcient level of investment κ(θ).
The intuition for over-investment in the visible activity is as follows. A worker
does not receive any beneﬁt from investment unless an outside oﬀer is generated.
When w − expmax{0,x} is low enough, a worker therefore over-invests in the
activity that increases the chance that the worker receives such an oﬀer. A possible
graph of G for θ = h, y(κ(h),h) >w− expmax{0,x} is given in Figure 2.3.
If we let z = w − expmax{0,x} the optimal allocation τθ(z) is characterized












• τθ(z)=κ(θ) if z>y (κ(θ),θ).
Proposition 2.3. The spot market investment decreases for z in the range (2.4).
Intuitively, the value of an oﬀer decreases as the base wage increases, so that
the beneﬁt of another unit of time invested decreases.
2.2.2. Spot Market Base Wage
Long-term contracts are infeasible and ﬁrms expect to earn zero proﬁts in the
spot market. In the event that a worker reveals an outside oﬀer to the inside ﬁrm,
competition for the worker bids up the worker’s price to the point at which the
ﬁrm makes zero proﬁts whether the worker stays or not. Since the ﬁrm earns zero
proﬁt on those workers who receive an oﬀer but stay with the ﬁrm and the ﬁrm
earns zero proﬁts over all workers, the ﬁrm must also expect to earn zero proﬁt
on those workers who do not reveal an oﬀer and so stay and earn the base wage.
That is, competition in the spot market forces the base wage to be equal to the
expected output of those who receive it. Suppose for example that the ﬁrm makes
positive proﬁt on average8 by paying a current base wage that is less than the
average output of those who receive it. In this case, one of two possibilities can
occur. Another ﬁrm can oﬀer a more attractive package (from the worker’s point
of view) that is also proﬁtable (from the ﬁrm’s point of view) by oﬀering a higher
base wage. This higher base wage, coupled with the spot market counteroﬀers, is
more attractive than the current base wage and so would attract all the base wage
earners away from the ﬁrm that oﬀers the current lower base wage. Alternatively,
if there are no other feasible proﬁtable contracts that attract workers away from
a ﬁrm that oﬀers the current low base wage, then entry occurs. Entry aﬀects the
8T h ec a s ei nw h i c ht h eﬁ r mm a k e sn e g a t i v ep r o ﬁ t so nt h o s ew h or e c e i v et h eb a s ew a g ec a n n o t
be sustained as the ﬁrm would then make negative proﬁts on average.
12probability of receiving an oﬀer and the expected output of workers who receive
the base wage. Adjustments take place until the base wage equals the expected
output of those workers who earn the base wage so that the ﬁrm earns zero proﬁts.
As a consequence, the equilibrium spot market base wage is a ﬁxed point of an
appropriately deﬁned function. An application of the envelope theorem implies
that a worker’s expected spot market wage rises with the base wage. In addition,
as the base wage increases, the optimal investment decreases toward the eﬃcient
investment and therefore output increases. Thus, if there are multiple ﬁxed points,
it makes sense for the spot market equilibrium wage to be the maximum of all
such ﬁxed points. It remains to argue that there exists a ﬁxed point.
Proposition 2.4. The spot market equilibrium base wage exists. At this wage,
the high-ability worker receives oﬀers with positive probability and the spot mar-
ket equilibrium investment of the high-ability worker is greater than the uncondi-
tional eﬃcient investment T(h) of such a worker.
The assumption that knowledgeable outside ﬁrms are scarce is reasonable when
information is costly and workers have to invest in self-promoting activities to
attract outside oﬀers. As the cost of information decreases to zero, entry occurs
so that the probability that a worker receives a counteroﬀer increases. As the
probability of receiving a counteroﬀer increases to one for all investment levels,
the spot market investment decreases to the eﬃcient level.
Since the spot market wage ws equals the expected output of those workers
who receive it and since those who don’t receive the base wage receive a wage






where zs = ws − expmax{0,x}.
Theorem 2.5. Under the spot market contract, the average wage of those who
leave a ﬁrm is strictly higher than the average wage of those who remain. This
diﬀerence persists even when we condition on high ability.
132.3. The Eﬃcient Contract
Recall that the unconditional eﬃcient investment T(θ) solves (2.2). It is easy
to devise a long-term contract that elicits this eﬃcient investment, T(θ),o nt h e
part of a worker if the worker is able to post a bond in the ﬁrst period (which is
forfeited if the worker’s investment is not eﬃcient). If there is no bound to the
bond that workers can pay then many contracts elicit eﬃcient investment but not
all such contracts are satisfactory. Two reasons are as follows.
1. Workers may not be matched eﬃciently to the inside and outside ﬁrms.
2. The bond that workers pay in the ﬁrst period to sustain the contract may be
substantial. If workers have limited access to capital markets, the contract
may not be feasible.
I ﬁnd the minimum bond associated with a contract that achieves eﬃcient in-
vestment and matching. The class of contracts that I consider stipulates payment
to the worker as a function of the information that the ﬁrm has about the worker.
The ﬁrm either knows y(t,θ) (because the worker has received an oﬀer and re-
vealed it to the ﬁrm) or doesn’t know y(t,θ) (because the worker has not received
an oﬀer or has received an oﬀer but did not reveal it to the ﬁrm). A contract
needs to stipulate what the worker receives in each case. The contracts are best
understood if one views the inside ﬁrm as selling the services of the worker to an
outside ﬁrm when it is eﬃcient to do so.
Consider the set of contracts Ω={(w,Ch,Cl) ∈  3 : w ≥ 0} where   is the
set of real numbers and a contract is interpreted as follows. The employer oﬀers
to pay (1) w to all workers who either do not reveal an oﬀer or reveal an oﬀer
and production level diﬀerent from y(T(θ),θ) for θ ∈{ h,l},a n d( 2 )w+Cθ to all
workers who reveal an oﬀer and production level y(T(θ),θ) for θ ∈{ h,l}.N o t e
that, by the terms of any contract in Ω, a worker can earn at least w by never
revealing an outside oﬀer, so that consistency requires w +Cθ ≥ w for θ ∈{ h,l}.
Thus, the relevant set of contracts is Ω+ = {(w,Ch,Cl) ∈  3 : w,Ch,Cl ≥ 0}.
14Each contract in Ω+ is associated with a bond (posted by a worker in the ﬁrst
period) that equals the expected loss of the ﬁrm in the second period (the payment
to the worker less the expected revenue from the worker’s services).
Let us interpret w to be a base wage; Cθ, a counteroﬀer (over and above the
base wage) for θ ∈{ h,l};a n dy(T(θ),θ) for θ ∈{ h,l}, a target output level whose
revelation triggers a counter oﬀer for a worker. We look for the contract that
minimizes the bond payment among incentive compatible, individually rational,
eﬃcient equilibrium contracts in Ω+. I ﬁrst discuss the constraints.
In order that a contract in Ω+ elicit the eﬃcient outcome, four sets of individual
rationality constraints must be satisﬁed. (1) Workers must be matched eﬃciently
when possible and a worker of type θ must want to invest in the eﬃcient level
T(θ). (2) Workers who invest eﬃciently must prefer to accept the payments from
the ﬁrm rather than negotiate separately with a raider. (3) It must not be possible
for a ﬁrm to renege on any detail of the contract and make a proﬁt. (4) Since
ﬁrms are proﬁt-maximizers, there must not be a feasible proﬁtable contract that
attracts workers away from ﬁrms that oﬀer the eﬃcient contract.
I now determine the constraints that the ﬁrst two conditions impose on a
contract in Ω+. The ﬁrst constraint requires that workers choose the eﬃcient
level of investment in V . A worker of any type who produces a target output
y(T(θ),θ) for some θ ∈{ h,l} e a r n sa tl e a s tw under a contract in Ω+ since each
counteroﬀer Cθ ≥ 0,f o rθ ∈{ h,l}. A worker whose output diﬀers from each
target output makes at most w since a raider need not oﬀer more than w to a
worker who receives no counteroﬀers. Thus, a worker prefers to produce a target
output when facing a contract in Ω+. Can a worker produce a target output by
investing ineﬃciently? Since p is increasing in the investment, a worker of type θ
prefers to produce y(T(θ),θ) by investing T(θ) rather than by investing t<T(θ)
(by Proposition 2.1 and by concavity only t<T(θ) is feasible). Does a worker of
one type want to pretend to be another type? A worker of type l is incapable of
producing y(T(h),h). However, a worker of type h can pretend to be of type l.I n
order that a worker of type h prefer to produce y(T(h),h) rather than y(T(l),l) it
15is required that p(T(h),h)Ch ≥ p(t,h)Cl for any t such that y(t,h)=y(T(l),l).
Let   T(h) denote the largest9 such investment level.
The ﬁrst constraint requires also that workers are matched eﬃciently to ﬁrms
whenever a worker’s production is revealed. In the case that a worker leaves, the
inside ﬁrm recovers payment equal to the worker’s output from the outside ﬁrm.
Thus, whether the worker leaves or stays, the inside ﬁrm receives a beneﬁt equal
to a worker’s output. In this case, it is optimal for a ﬁrm to sell the services of a
revealed worker to a rival ﬁrm only when x>0.
The second constraint requires that workers have no incentive to negotiate
separately with the outside ﬁrm when the opportunity arises. For θ ∈{ h,l},l e t
pθ∗
denote p(T(θ),θ), the eﬃcient probability that an oﬀer is received, and let yθ∗
denote y(T(θ),θ), the eﬃcient output. Under a contract in Ω+, once a worker
reveals yθ∗
, the outside and inside ﬁrms each value the worker at yθ∗
and a worker
is paid w+Cθ. However, the worker can always earn w by not revealing an outside
oﬀer. Consequently, the constraint requires that w + Cθ ≥ max{w,yθ∗
}.
I now consider the variation in the implicit bond across contracts in Ω+ that
satisfy the ﬁrst two individual rationality constraints. The inside ﬁrm pays the
worker at least w w h e t h e ro rn o tt h ew o r k e rr e c e i v e sa no ﬀ e r .W h e nt h ew o r k e r
receives and reveals an oﬀer, the ﬁrm pays Cθ if the output produced is yθ∗
.T h e
inside ﬁrm receives the beneﬁt of the worker’s productivity directly if the worker

























h ≥ p(  T(h),h)C
l.
9Ceteris paribus, a worker prefers the higher probability of an oﬀer (which increases in t).
16Denote by Cl∗






− w if 0 ≤ w ≤ yl∗
0 if yl∗ ≤ w
which is piecewise linear, continuous, decreasing and convex in w.









ph∗ if 0 ≤ w ≤ y
yh∗
− w if y ≤ w ≤ yh∗
0 if yh∗ ≤ w










and y =0if not. The minimum feasible value of Ch (Ch∗
(w)) is piecewise linear,
continuous, decreasing and convex in w.
Proposition 2.6. Given any ﬁxed base wage w, the bond associated with an
eﬃcient contract (w,Ch,Cl) ∈ Ω+ that satisﬁes the ﬁrst two individual rationality
constraints decreases as Ch and Cl decrease until Cl = Cl∗
(w) and Ch = Ch∗
(w).
Proof. The bond is linear, separable and increasing in the base wage and the
counteroﬀers. Therefore, conditional on a base wage, the bond decreases as Cl
and Ch decrease until Cl = Cl∗
(w) and Ch = Ch∗
(w).
Thus, for any given base wage w, the minimum bond must consist of coun-
teroﬀers that are at the boundary levels Cθ∗
(w) for θ ∈{ l,h} imposed by the
ﬁrst two individual rationality constraints. Let   p = p(  T(h),h) and let B∗(w)=
B(w,Ch∗(w),Cl∗(w)) (where B is deﬁned in (2.6)) be the value of the bond for
a given base wage and its minimum counteroﬀers. In the eﬃcient contract that
minimizes the bond subject to all four individual rationality constraints, the base
wage and counteroﬀers are uniquely determined in the next theorem.
17Theorem 2.7. In the eﬃcient contract (w,Ch,Cl) ∈ Ω that minimizes the bond
subject to the four individual rationality constraints, the base wage equals
we =
πlyl∗ + πhyh∗[1 − ph∗]
















Note that, in essence, under the eﬃcient contract, the ﬁrm pays the low-skilled
worker a severance package w − yl∗ whenever the low-skilled worker receives an
oﬀer from an outside ﬁrm that provides the worker with a superior match.
In the proof of Theorem 2.7 I argue that reputation plays a role in providing
incentivies for the ﬁrm to make good its threat to reward only workers who have
revealed eﬃciently. Let’s consider the following example from academia. Suppose
that all but one individual at a middle-ranked school is investing eﬃciently in
research and teaching. One of its professors has received an oﬀer that indicates
more than the eﬃcient number of middle-brow research publications at the cost
of a notable decrease in teaching eﬀectiveness relative to some norm. The school
has two options, both of which result in zero proﬁts. One option is not to respond
to the oﬀer as promised. Though not modelled as such, it may do so in the hopes
of opening up a slot to someone who invests eﬃciently. Another option is to break
its commitment and oﬀer a bonus to the ineﬃcient invester. It then takes the risk
that all other such professors at the school then over-invest in low- to middle-brow
research and under-invest in teaching in order to increase their chances of receiving
a bonus. As argued in the Appendix, expected wages are higher under the eﬃcient
contract than under the spot market contract and so workers would eventually
leave the school. A mid-ranked school does not have unlimited capacity to gain
from more and more middle-brow research at the expense of teaching. Middle-
brow research alone is not as highly valued at the school as a balance between
middle-brow research and decent teaching.
18Below, as in the spot market contract, I show that there is a negative seniority
wage premium for workers in the eﬃcient contract. Intuitively, high-ability work-
ers who leave the ﬁrm earn a high wage yh∗
while high-ability workers who stay
earn either yh∗ or the base wage we. The wage of low-ability workers is constant
at we.10 Thus, the average wage of a leaver must be greater than that of a stayer.
Theorem 2.8. Under the bond-minimizing eﬃcient contract, the average wage
of those who leave a ﬁrm is strictly higher than the average wage of those who
remain. This diﬀerence persists even when we condition on high ability.
The bond minimizing eﬃcient contract (that satisﬁes the four individual ratio-
nality constraints) shares the following properties with the spot market contract.
(i) The base wage equals the expected output of those who receive it.
(ii) High-ability workers invest more in the visible activity.
(iii) High-ability workers are more likely to leave the ﬁrm.
(iv) The average earnings of those who leave the ﬁrm are higher than those of
those who stay. This remains true when one conditions on high ability.
In addition, the bond minimizing eﬃcient contract also satisﬁes.
(v) Only high-ability workers receive an increase in wage.
(vi) Low-ability workers who are revealed and leave are essentially paid a
severance pay of we − yl∗ to leave by the inside ﬁrm.
One incentive is provided by the threat of the incumbent ﬁrm to pay no more
than we to any worker who is revealed to have invested ineﬃciently. The implica-
tion of the incumbent ﬁrm’s threat in this context is that a sole outside ﬁrm need
n o to ﬀ e rm o r et h a nwe to such a worker. The incumbent ﬁrm exploits the scarcity
of knowledgeable outside ﬁrms in the eﬃcient contract. The assumption that
knowledgeable outside ﬁrms are scarce is reasonable when information is costly
and workers have to invest in self-promotion to attract outside oﬀers.
10If one interprets w as a salary (equal to average output) and yh∗
as a piece-rate value of
output (at a piece rate of 1) then the average output of those who receive a salary is less than
that of those who receive the piece rate, as in Lazear (1986b).
19Another incentive in the contract is provided by the promise of the ﬁrm to
match outside oﬀers of those who make eﬃcient investments. The promise of
matching oﬀers acts somewhat like a bonus in that it provides incentives for
workers to invest eﬃciently. Note that the ability to commit is necessary for
the contract to work. In the context of a game with a long-lived ﬁrm and short-
lived workers who arrive periodically over an inﬁnite horizon, commitment can be
enforced by reputation as argued in the proof of Theorem 2.7. In the spot market
case, it is proﬁtable for the incumbent ﬁrm to match outside oﬀers of ineﬃcient
workers since there is no reputation to lose by doing so.
If severance is not part of the contract, the low-ability worker chooses not to
reveal any outside oﬀer and remains with the ﬁrm so that the ﬁrm loses w−yl∗ on
each such worker. If severance pay is part of the contract, the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent
between the low-ability worker staying or leaving as the ﬁrm loses w−yl∗ in either
case. The ﬁrm has no positive incentive to oﬀer severance pay but severance pay
provides incentives for the low-ability worker to switch ﬁrms when it is eﬃcient
to do so. Thus, as in the hold-up literature (e.g. Edlin and Reichelstein, 1996)
severance payments that are imposed by law and contingent on outside oﬀers may
be used to implement the eﬃcient contract.
3. Model Variations
If, with probability p(t,θ) a worker’s output is revealed simultaneously to both
the inside and outside ﬁrms, an outside ﬁrm makes an oﬀer even if y(t,θ) <z
because the oﬀer is automatically revealed to the inside ﬁrm. However, as in the
basic model, workers who leave earn more on average than those who stay in both
the spot market11 contract and the eﬃcient contract.
If expmax{0,x} is so large that T(h)=1and p(1,h)=1 , then the spot
market contract is eﬃcient and all high-skilled workers receive job oﬀers so that
11The essential modiﬁcation to the proof of Proposition 2.4 in the Appendix is that choosing
t =0takes the place of choosing not to reveal an oﬀer. So, when z = y(κ(θ),θ),t h ew o r k e ri s
indiﬀerent between investing t =0and investing t = κ(θ).
20the negative seniority wage premium disappears if one conditions on ability.
4. Conclusion
The model explains how a rational ﬁrm may respond strategically to outside oﬀers
in the presence of self-promoting activities. A rational employee seeks scarce
outside oﬀers that may result in an increase in salary. Firms exploit the scarcity
of outside oﬀers to induce employees to make the eﬃcient investment. I conclude
by oﬀering more details of an application of the results to academia.
University administrators usually know less about a professor’s productivity
than do a professor’s peers.12 Even if a department is informed of a professor’s
productivity, it may not be prudent for the university administration to rely on a
department’s internal evaluation. Frequently, professors at other universities have
a more accurate perception of an individual’s performance relative to that of the
professor’s university administration. Thus, the polar assumption of no insider
informational advantage in the basic model is reasonable.
Academic research corresponds to the self-promoting investment in the model.
Research increases both the productivity and visibility of the professor. Teaching
corresponds to the non-visible activity of the model.13 Research is what entices
a university to consider looking more closely at an individual. An oﬀer from a
school is a signal of a researcher’s output. Even research which does not push
the frontiers of knowledge might still give some indication of teaching ability.
Most schools are interested somewhat in research and teaching. However, there
is a limit to how much a low-ranked or middle-ranked school is willing to reward
another medium-quality publication that is accompanied by a noticeable decrease
in teaching eﬀectiveness. The schools at the very top may be interested only
in researchers whose eﬃcient allocation of time is to spend all on high-quality
research. An oﬀer from a high-quality research insitituion is a signal of high-
12The problems that academic employers face are discussed more broadly in Siow (1998).
13University administration positions like Dean or Chair are scarce and so should be treated
separately. Depending on the position, administration duties can be either visible or invisible.
21quality publications. An oﬀer from a middle-quality research oriented school is a
signal of reasonable quality publications and reasonable teaching. In my model,
I assume that the signal of an oﬀer is perfect. The main results of the model are
robust to adding noise to the signal.
Due to the lack of information about how to evaluate the productivity of their
professors, universities pay professors relatively uniform salaries within a discipline
with the exception of those who receive an outside oﬀer. Professors in some
disciplines spend a lot of eﬀort trying to generate outside oﬀers. When a professor
receives an outside oﬀer that indicates eﬃcient investment, the university begins
to renegotiate the professor’s salary. Whether the raider succeeds in attracting
the professor or not, the professor ends up with a higher salary.
Not all academic oﬀers need result in a counter-oﬀer. Though there are only
two levels of ability in the paper, I oﬀer an explanation of this when there are
three levels: high, medium and low. A middle-ranked research university may
respond to an oﬀer received by a top-ranked university as such an oﬀer indicates
the highest-quality of research and it could be that the eﬃcient allocation of
time to teaching is zero in this case. It may also respond to an oﬀer received
by a middle-ranked university as such an oﬀer indicates mid-quality research and
teaching. However, it may not respond to an oﬀer from a low-ranked university as
such an oﬀer might indicate too much medium- or low-quality research relative to
the teaching standard at a mid-ranked school. In other words, the counter-oﬀer
comes about as a result of accepted standards of teaching and research.
The process of raising salaries on the evidence of an outside oﬀer can explain
the empirical ﬁnding of a negative seniority wage premium in the U.S. academic
labour. Ransom (1993), Hallock (1994), Moore et al. (1994) ﬁnd that the wages
of professors decrease with seniority in a university. Ransom obtains this empiri-
cal result using OLS on cross section data14 when controlling for experience and
quantity of publications. Bratsberg et al. (2003) obtain this empirical result using
14He uses cross section data on a large sample of universities from 1973. He also considers
data from the University of Arizona for the years 1972, 77 and 82.
22OLS and Topel’s two stage estimator on panel data15 when controlling for years of
experience as well as publication quantity and quality16. This ﬁnding cannot be
explained by an appeal to the ability of more productive workers to attract oﬀers
as it persists when the empirical studies control for productivity. This empirical
ﬁnding in academia contrasts with the positive seniority wage premium found in
the general working population (e.g. Altonji and Shakotko, 1987, Topel, 1991).
Ransom (1993) attributes the negative seniority wage premium in academia
to monopsonistic salary discrimination. In his view, universities oﬀer lower than
market wages to those that remain in their employ to exploit the existence of
positive moving costs. Only those employees with high moving costs remain.
As time goes on, professors with high seniority will have higher average moving
costs. In Ransom’s model, the university knows the productivity, moving costs,
and outside opportunities of each of its professors. The university pays each of
its individual professors diﬀerent wages. Professors face an outside market wage
but may choose to stay and accept a lower wage due to the high cost of moving.
In contrast, in my model, professors of a given productivity and seniority may
receive diﬀerential salaries due to the random receipt of outside oﬀers. Ransom’s
analytic model predicts that the negative seniority wage premium should exist in
any industry for which the worker’s human capital is mainly general (or, at least,
industry-speciﬁc rather than ﬁrm-speciﬁc) and the moving costs are positive. His
model predicts that the salaries of free agents in baseball and basketball and the
salaries of non-unionized high school teachers should display the negative seniority
15They use longitudinal data to examine the salary of economics faculty at ﬁve public mid-
ranked universities in the Midwest U.S. from 1975 through 1995.
16Moore et al. (1998) use OLS on cross-section data on 1993-94 salaries of tenured faculty
from nine state universities. They ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient on seniority is negative when not
controlling for quality of research but is not diﬀerent from zero when controlling for quality of
research. I note that it makes sense to interpret their estimated coeﬃcient as an overestimate of
the true return to ﬁrm seniority. As argued analogously in Topel (1991), there is more mobility
if the true coeﬃcient is negative than when it is zero. If the true coeﬃcient is negative then
some otherwise undesirable oﬀers are accepted. This increases the average wage of stayers and
decreases the average wage of movers. So, OLS should overestimate the returns to seniority.
That is, an estimate of zero returns is consistent with the true returns being negative.
23wage premium even when conditioning on productivity and that the negative wage
premium holds equally across all university academic disciplines.
In contrast, my model predicts that a negative seniority wage premium in any
perfectly competitive industry for which (i) human capital is general (or, at least
industry- and not ﬁrm-speciﬁc) (ii) there are no trade secrets, (iii) outside oﬀers
are scarce, (iv) employees engage in multiple tasks of which some are visible and
some are invisible to the outside market, and (v) employee output is costly to
assess. The negative seniority wage premium exists even if one conditions on high
productivity. Thus, for example, professional athletes who are free agents do not
fall into the framework of this model as output is monitored constantly and any
athlete who is paid below marginal product will be revealed as such.
My model can explain how the seniority wage premium may vary across disci-
plines, time, and schools. Exogenous factors, like the speed of information trans-
mission and economic conditions, aﬀect the probability that an individual will
obtain an oﬀer and so aﬀect the relationship between wage and seniority. If the
probability of an oﬀer is one for a high-quality researcher, the negative seniority
wage gap should disappear if one conditions on high-quality productivity. If the
probability of an oﬀer is zero, then wages are independent of seniority.
Though not modelled as such, my model can explain the existence of lower-
quality academic journals. Though lower-quality journals may have less direct
academic merit, their existence allows academic markets to behave eﬃciently.
The guaranteed base wage in the minimum bond eﬃcient contract has an
element of academic tenure in that tenure enables a university to guarantee a
minimum wage17 for professors18. The most common criticism of academic tenure
is that it encourages tenured professors to shirk. (See for example, Alchian, 1959.)
The present model suggests that this argument is incomplete. The promise of ﬁrms
to respond strategically to outside oﬀers creates incentives for workers to invest
17The guaranteed base wage has bite especially in the case that the information about a worker
is simultaneously revealed to both the inside and outside ﬁrms.
18Models of tenure include those of Chen and Ferris (1999), Carmichael (1988), Freeman
(1977), and McPherson and Whinston (1983). See Siow (1998).
24eﬃciently. The model highlights the importance that a university’s response to
outside oﬀers has in the promotion of eﬃcient investment in research.
A. Appendix
Proposition A.1. κ(θ) increases in θ if yt increases in θ for t ∈ [0,1]. In addition,
if both yt and pt increase in θ for t ∈ [0,1] then T(θ) increases in θ and a low-ability
worker is unable to produce y(κ(h),h).
Proof. (1) If θ increases to θ
￿ then the assumption that yt increases in θ implies
that the left hand side of equation (2.1) is positive at (κ(θ),θ
￿). The assumption
that y is concave in t then implies that κ(θ
￿) ≥ κ(θ).( 2 )I fθ increases to θ
￿ then
the assumption that both yt and pt increase in θ imply that the left hand side of
equation (2.2) is positive at (T(θ),θ
￿). The assumption that y and p are concave
in t then implies that T(θ
￿) ≥ T(θ).S i n c ey is concave in t and since yt increases
in θ, the results follows.
Proof. (PROPOSITION 2.2): Let
i
θ(z)=m i n {t ∈ [0,κ(θ)] : y(t,θ) ≥ z},
e
θ(z)=m a x {t ∈ [κ(θ),1] : y(t,θ) ≥ z}.
If y(κ(θ),θ) >zthen I ﬁrst show that argmaxtG>κ (θ) a n dt h e nt h a tG is
concave on [κ(θ),e θ(w)].S i n c eyt > 0 on [0,κ(θ)) with equality only at t = κ(θ),
if iθ(z) <t≤ κ(θ) and y(κ(θ),θ) >zthen
Gt(t,θ,z)=pt(t,θ)[y(t,θ) − z]+p(t,θ)yt(t,θ) > 0.
Thus, G strictly increases in t ≥ iθ(z) until t = κ(θ) at which point Gt > 0 so
that argmaxG>κ (θ). In addition, we note that if y(t,θ)=z at t = eθ(w),t h i s
implies that Gt < 0 at t = eθ(w) since yt < 0 for t>κ (θ).I fy(t,θ) ≥ z then
Gtt(t,θ,z)=ptt(t,θ)[y(t,θ) − z]
+2pt(t,θ)yt(t,θ)+p(t,θ)ytt(t,θ).
25Since y is decreasing in t for t>κ (θ), p is increasing in t,a n dp and y are concave
in t, it is immediate that G is concave in t for t ∈ [κ(θ),e θ(w)].
Thus, G is constant in t and equal to w for t<i θ(w) (when y(t,θ) <w−
expmax{0,x}); G strictly increases in t from iθ(w) until κ(θ) (where y(t,θ) >
w − expmax{0,x}); G is concave in t for t ∈ [κ(θ),e θ(w)] (where y(t,θ) ≥ w −
expmax{0,x}); G is constant in t and equal to w for t>e θ(w) (where y(t,θ) <w −
expmax{0,x}); Gt < 0 at t = eθ(w) (if y(t,θ)=w−expmax{0,x} at t = eθ(w)).
This implies that ﬁrst order conditions are suﬃcient to characterize argmaxG in
t h ec a s et h a ty(κ(θ),θ) >w− expmax{0,x}. That is, either Gt(t,θ,w)=0at
t = τθ(w) ∈ [T(θ),e θ(w)] or Gt(1,θ,w) > 0 at t = τθ(w)=eθ(w)=1 .
If y(T(θ),θ) <zthen the worker is indiﬀerent among all allocations.
Proof. (PROPOSITION 2.3): The result follows since the left-hand side of
(2.3) decreases in z and t (as shown in the proof of Proposition 2.2).
Proof. (PROPOSITION 2.4): Let yθ = y(κ(θ),θ) and let pθ = p(κ(θ),θ)
and recall that z = w − expmax{0,x}. I ﬁrst construct the expected output of
workers who receive the base wage. If z<y θ,t h e nτθ(z) ∈ (κ(θ),1] and any
outside oﬀer is revealed so that worker θ receives the base wage with probability
1 − p(τθ(z),θ).I fz = yθ,t h e nτθ(z)=κ(θ) and worker θ is indiﬀerent between
revealing an outside oﬀer and not. That is, for every αθ ∈ [0,1], revealing an
outside oﬀer with probability αθ is optimal for worker θ.T h u s , i f z = yθ,t h e n
the probability that worker θ receives the base wage is 1 − αθpθ.I fz>y θ,t h e n
τθ(w)=κ(θ) and worker θ receives the base wage with probability one.
Let S(z) represent the expected output of stayers who receive the base wage.
S(z)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
πly(τl(z),l)[1−p(τl(z),l)]+πhy(τh(z),h)[1−p(τh(z),h)]
πl[1−p(τl(z),l)]+πh[1−p(τh(z),h)] if z<y l
πlyl[1−αlpl]+πhy(τh(z),h)[1−p(τh(z),h)]
πl[1−αlpL]+πh[1−p(τh(z),h)] if z = yl for αl ∈ [0,1]
πlyl+πhy(τh(z),h)[1−p(τh(z),h)]
πl+πh[1−p(τh(z),h)] if yl <z<y h
πlyl+πhyh[1−αhph]
πl+πh[1−αhph] if z = yh for αh ∈ [0,1]
πlyl + πhyh if yh <z
For z<y l an increase in z decreases τθ(z) (Proposition 2.3) and therefore in-
creases y(τθ(z),θ) for θ ∈{ l,h}. Although output increases for each type of
26worker as z increases, S(z) may decrease since the mix of workers who receive
the base wage also ﬂuctuates. For yl <z<y h an increase in z decreases τh(z)
(Proposition 2.3) and therefore decreases p(τh(z),h),i n c r e a s e sy(τh(z),h),a n d
so S(z) increases since the proportion of those who produce y(τh(z),h) and re-
ceive the base wage is increasing. For z>y h an increase in z has no eﬀect on
S(z).N o t et h a tlimz↑yl S(z) > limz↓yl S(z) since low-ability workers do not reveal
outside oﬀers when z>y l.T h u sa sz crosses yl there is an increase in the prob-
ability that a worker who receives the base wage has low ability. The eﬀect is to
decrease the expected output of those who receive the base wage. Analogously
limz↑yh S(z) < limz↓yh S(z) due to the increase in the probability that a worker
who receives the base wage has high ability as z crosses yh.A t z = yl, S(z)
is a vertical line that connects the higher limz↑yl S(z) to the lower limz↓yl S(z).
At z = yh, S(z) is a vertical line that connects the lower limz↑yh S(z) to the
higher limz↓yh S(z). The upper hemi-continuous correspondence S is a continuous
function everywhere but at z = yl and z = yh.
Since outputs lie between 0 and yh, the range of S(z) ⊂ [0,yh].S i n c e S is
convex-valued and closed on [0,yh] Kakutani’s ﬁxed point theorem guarantees
that there exist w ∈ [0,y h] such that S(w − E max{0,x})=w. Since the range
of S is [0,y h), the ﬁxed points lie in [0,y h). The fact that S is upper hemi-
continuous on a closed and bounded interval ensures that the maximum of the
s e to fﬁ x e dp o i n te x i s t s .( L e tF(w)=S(w − expmax{0,x}) − w on I =[ 0 ,y h].
The set of ﬁxed points is the set {w ∈ I : F(w)=0 } = F −1(0) which is closed
and bounded since {0} is a closed set, F is upper hemi-continuous, and I is
bounded. Since the set of ﬁxed points is closed and bounded, its maximum exists.)
The equilibrium spot market base wage is the maximum base wage for which
ws = S(ws − expmax{0,x}).S i n c e zs = ws − expmax{0,x} <y h, the high-
ability worker invests τh(zs) >κ (h) (Proposition 2.3) in the visible activity and
so receives oﬀers with positive probability.
Lastly, suppose the unique ﬁxed point is w such that z = yl. A low-ability
worker is indiﬀerent between revealing an outside oﬀer or not and so leaves with
27probability αl upon receiving an oﬀer. There exists α∗ ∈ [0,1] such that the
expected output of workers who receive the base wage equals the base wage only
if αl = α∗.I f z<y l then the expected output is greater than the base wage
and the base wage is bid up. If z>y l then the expected output is smaller than
the base wage and the base wage is bid down. Thus, the equilibrium base wage
must be ws = yl + E max{0,x}.I fz = yl and αl >α ∗ then the expected output
is greater than the base wage and entry increases the probability of an oﬀer at
any given allocation of time and decreases the expected output. If z = yl and
αl <α ∗ then the expected output is less than the base wage and exit decreases the
probability of an oﬀer at any given allocation of time and increases the expected
output. Thus, αl = α∗. Competition results in equality between the base wage
and the expected output of workers who receive the base wage.
Note that since the output of the high-ability worker is greater than ws,e i t h e r

























s),h) − w) < 0
which implies that τh(zs) >T(h) (since y and p are concave).
Proof. (THEOREM 2.5): Since the spot market base wage equals the expected
output of those who receive it, the expected wage of those who stay is
πh(1 − P(h))yh + πl(1 − P(l))yl
πh(1 − P(h)) + πl(1 − P(l))
where yθ represents the spot market output of a worker of ability θ and P(θ) is the
probability that a worker leaves conditional on ability θ ∈{ l,h}. The expected
wage of those who leave is
πhP(h)yh + πlP(l)yl
πhP(h)+πlP(l)





πh(1 − P(h)) + πl(1 − P(l))






which is true since
P(h) >P(l)
If addition, the average wage of high ability workers who leave is higher than that
of high ability workers who stay since yh is greater than ws.
Proof. (THEOREM 2.7): By Proposition 2.6, it suﬃces to minimize B∗(w)






πl(w − yl∗)(1 − pl∗)+πh(w − yh∗ +   p(yl∗ − w)) if 0 ≤ w ≤ y





≤ w ≤ yh∗
πl(w − yl∗)+πh(w − yh∗) if yh∗ ≤ w
(A.1)
is a continuous, piecewise linear function of w that is negative for 0 ≤ w ≤ yl∗
(since w<y l∗ <y h∗); positive for yh∗ ≤ w; and increases in w for w ∈ (yl∗,y h∗)
(since πl > 0 and πh(1 − ph∗
) > 0). Thus, B∗(w) has a unique root in (yl∗
,y h∗
).
I now argue that the unique root of B∗(w) i st h eb a s ew a g eo ft h ee ﬃ c i e n t
contract that satisﬁes the fourth individual rationality constraint. If the bond is
negative, the contract is proﬁtable in the second period so that another ﬁrm can
oﬀer another contract that satisﬁes the ﬁrst two individual rationality constraints
and that oﬀers a higher base wage that is also proﬁtable and attracts workers away
from the ﬁrst contract at the end of the ﬁrst period before the worker is revealed.
Thus, the minimum bond consistent with the fourth individual rationality con-
straint must be greater than or equal to zero. If the bond is strictly positive then
the contract loses money in the second period and there exists another contract
29with a bond that is smaller but still positive. Thus, the minimum bond consistent
with rationality constraints 1, 2 and 4 is one in which the base wage is we such
that B∗(we)=0 , and the counteroﬀers are Cθ = Cθ∗
(we) for θ ∈{ h,l}.S i n c et h e












It remains to show that the third individual rationality constraint is satisﬁed.
That is, a ﬁrm would rather abide by the above eﬃcient contract than renege. The
ﬁrm is long-lived. There are short-lived workers who must choose an employer and
make an investment decision in the ﬁrst period of their life. If the ﬁrm reneges19,
workers infer that the ﬁrm will honour only spot market contracts in the future
and so workers make spot market investments if hired by a ﬁrm that reneges. In
any case, the ﬁrm breaks even under the terms of the spot market contract so
that the expected output (πly(τl(zs),l)+πhy(τh(zs),h) as given in formula (2.5)
is essentially transferred to the workers. However, the sum of the expected wage












where T(θ) = argmaxy(t,θ)+p(t,θ),θ)expmax{0,x}. Workers prefer the ﬁrms
that oﬀer the eﬃcient contract to any ﬁrm that oﬀers the spot market contract
so that a ﬁrm prefers to honour the terms of the eﬃcient contract.
Proof. (THEOREM 2.8): A worker who is revealed will leave the ﬁrm when-
ever x>0. Thus, the average wage of those who leave the inside ﬁrm equals
πhph∗(1 − F(0))yh∗ + πlpl∗we(1 − F(0))







πhph∗ + πlpl∗ .( A . 2 )
19The ﬁrm can renege in three ways: (1) not pay the base wage, (2) not meet the oﬀer of the
outside ﬁrm when output is revealed to be eﬃcient, (3) meet the oﬀer of the outside ﬁrm when
output is revealed to be ineﬃcient.






1 − ph∗ 





πh[1 − ph∗(1 − F(0))] + πl [1 − pl∗(1 − F(0))]
.( A . 3 )
The coeﬃcient of yh∗






























so the average wage of leavers is higher than that of stayers. Also, yh∗ >w e
implies the result holds when conditioning on high ability.
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